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IN SEARCH OF DUE PROCESS: NOTICE
IN NEW YORK ADMINISTRATIVE TAX
SALES
In the state of New York, the real property tax is a locally
levied and administered tax.1 In addition to the New York Real
Property Tax Law ("RPTL"), which contains general procedures
that may be used statewide for the administration of property
taxes,2 many localities impose property taxes under their local
laws.3 Taxes on real property have been and continue to be the
I See N.Y. CONST. art. IX, § 2(c)(8). This section of the state constitution allows locali-
ties to levy and collect property taxes. See infra note 3. Real property taxes are levied by
each "assessing unit," defined by the New York Real Property Tax Law ("RPTL") as "a
city, town, county having a county department of assessment with the power to assess real
property, or a village .... " N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 102(1) (McKinney Supp. 1987).
"With minor exceptions, there have been no taxes on real property actually levied by the
State of New York itself since 1928, all such taxes being levied by municipalities." Godfrey,
Enforcement of Delinquent Property Taxes in New York, 24 ALB. L. REV. 271, 274 n.7
(1960). The real property tax is an ad valorem tax, based upon the value of the property
taxed. See N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 102(14) (McKinney Supp. 1987); Ampco Printing-
Advertiser's Offset Corp. v. City of New York, 14 N.Y.2d 11, 22, 197 N.E.2d 285, 288, 247
N.Y.S.2d 865, 870, appeal dismissed, 379 U.S. 5 (1964). The most attractive aspect of a real
property tax is the theoretical ease and certainty of collection; the land itself is a readily
available, unconcealable asset from which the taxing authority may satisfy the taxes due.
See Godfrey, supra, at 273-74; REPORT OF THE STATE OF NEw YORK TEMPORARY COMMISSION
ON THE REAL PROPERTY TAX 1-2 (1979) [hereinafter TAX COMMISSION REPORT].
2 See N.Y. REAL PRop. TAX LAW §§ 900-1097 (McKinney 1972 & Supp. 1987). The
RPTL consolidated the general laws relating to assessment and taxation of real property.
See Town of Harrison v. County of Westchester, 46 Misc. 2d 1035, 1040-41, 261 N.Y.S.2d
627, 633 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1965), modified on other grounds, 25 App. Div. 2d
759, 269 N.Y.S.2d 508 (2d Dep't), modified on other grounds, 18 N.Y.2d 759, 222 N.E.2d
742, 276 N.Y.S.2d 124 (1966). "The memorandum of the Advisory Committee to the Board
of Equalization and Assessment On the Real Property Tax Law made it clear that it was a
consolidation, recodification, rearrangement, simplification and restatement of general laws
relating to assessment and taxation of real property...." Id.; see also N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX
LAW § 1570 (McKinney Supp. 1987) (authorizing Board of Equalization and Assessment to
establish minimum standards for real property tax administration).
3 See N.Y. CONsT. art. IX, § 2(c)(ii) "[E]very local government shall have power to
adopt and amend local laws not inconsistent with the provisions of this constitution or any
general law relating to the following subjects... (8) The levy, collection and administration
of local taxes authorized by the legislature and of assessments for local improvements, con-
sistent with laws enacted by the legislature." Id. "This chapter shall not be deemed to re-
peal or otherwise affect the provisions of any special or local law.., it being the intention of
the legislature that the same shall continue in full force and effect . . ." N.Y. REAL PROP.
TAX LAW § 1606 (McKinney 1972). Some of the largest municipalities in the state use their
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largest single source of revenue for New York's municipalities.4
Thus, it is important for the financial health of the municipality
that the real property tax be efficiently enforced.5 The methods
used to enforce the payment of delinquent property taxes include:
levying upon any personal property of the delinquent taxpayer;'
instituting supplementary proceedings akin to an action upon a
judgment docketed;7 foreclosure of tax liens, as in an action to
own tax sale procedures. See, e.g., NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE §§ 11-201 to 11-428 (1986);
WESTCHESTER COUNTY, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE §§ 283.091 to .671 (1987), reprinted in 1 N.Y.
State & Loc. Tax Serv. (P-H) 1 34,060-34,095 (1962); NASSAU COUNTY, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE §§
5-2.0 to 6-29.0 (1981), reprinted in 1 N.Y. St. & Loc. Tax Serv. (P-H) 17 33,810-33,871
(1961). The rationale for "home rule" in New York is "a recognition that essentially local
problems should be dealt with locally and that effective local self-government is the desired
objective." Kelley v. McGee, 57 N.Y.2d 522, 535, 443 N.E.2d 908, 912, 457 N.Y.S.2d 434, 438
(1982). See generally Godfrey, supra note 1, at 287-90 (historical discussion of "home rule"
collection of property taxes).
4 See THE TEMPORARY STATE COMMISSION ON STATE AND LOCAL FINANCES, VOL. 2: THE
REAL PROPERTY TAX 6 (1975); Godfrey, supra note 1, at 274.
For the fiscal year ending in 1984, local governments in New York State raised
$11,782.2 million (of their total revenues of $37,049.7 million, which includes money from
the state and federal governments) from real property taxes. THE NELSON A. ROCKEFELLER
INSTITUTE OF GOVERNMENT, 1985-86 NEW YORK STATE STATISTICAL YEARBOOK 386 (12th ed.
1986).
s See Harris v. Gaul, 572 F. Supp. 1554, 1554-57 (N.D. Ohio 1983) (discussing how
property tax administration caused financial problems for Cleveland); Comment, Mennonite
Board of Missions v. Adams: Insufficient Notice Under the New York In Rem Statutes, 33
BUFFALO L. REV. 389, 404 n.82 (1984) (large dollar amounts lost to delinquent property taxes
in Boston, Chicago, and New York City); see also L. SCHROEDER & D. SJOQUIST. THE PROP-
ERTY TAX AND ALTERNATIVE LOCAL TAXES: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 1-10 (1975) (suggesting
real property taxes may be incapable of meeting needs of large cities).
6 See N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 926(2) (McKinney 1972). Once notice of the auction
has been posted for at least six days in three public places in the city or town where the sale
is to take place, the owner's personal property is then seized and sold at public auction. Id.
§ 926(2), (3) (McKinney 1972). This action is taken by the collecting officer of the munici-
pality. Id. § 926(2); see also N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 102(5) (McKinney 1984) (collecting
officer defined). Levying upon personal property is possible because the owner of real prop-
erty is personally liable for the tax due on his property. See id. § 926(1) (McKinney 1972).
This remedy is rarely invoked by taxing authorities, presumably because to do so on a regu-
lar basis would require procedures that are inefficient relative to proceedings against prop-
erty. See 1 N.Y. St. & Loc. Tax Serv. (P-H) 1 31,570 (May 7, 1986); 3 N.Y. Tax Serv. (MB)
76.20 (1987).
See N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 990 (McKinney 1972); NASSAU COUNTY, N.Y., ADMIN.
CODE § 5-32.0 (1981), reprinted in 1 N.Y. St. & Loc. Tax Serv. (P-H) 71 33,826 (May 22,
1948). This action is taken by the county treasurer after the collecting officer has returned
the tax unpaid. N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 990(1) (McKinney 1972); see also N.Y. CIV.
PRAC. L. & R. 5201-5252 (McKinney 1978 & Supp. 1987) (describing procedures for enforce-
ment of judgment docketed). The advantage of these procedures is that the delinquent tax-
payer is brought into court to determine whether there are any assets from which the tax
may be satisfied. See N.Y. CIv. PRAC. L. & R. 5231 (McKinney 1978). Again, these procedures
are rarely used due to tax districts' preference for the more reliable proceedings against
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foreclose a mortgage;8 and the oldest and most controversial proce-
dure, the administrative tax sale.9
The administrative tax sale is viewed as a relatively quick way
to collect delinquent property taxes and to transfer property from
delinquent taxpayers to persons willing and able to pay their
taxes.10 Implicit in this procedure is a conflict between the interest
of the municipality in seasonably collecting the tax due and the
constitutional right of the delinquent taxpayer to receive due pro-
cess before being deprived of his property.1" Recently, several
courts have differed as to the constitutionality of administrative
tax sale procedures used in New York.1 2 Nassau County has re-
realty. See 1 N.Y. St. & Loc. Tax Serv. (P-H) 31,570 (May 7, 1986); 3 N.Y. Tax Serv. (MB)
76.20 (1987).
5 See N.Y. REAL PROP. TAx LAW §§ 1110-1116 (McKinney 1972 & Supp. 1987). Article
11 of the RPTL is New York's enactment of the Uniform Delinquent Tax Enforcement Act
("Uniform Act"), which allows any tax district to adopt provisions for the foreclosure of tax
liens, as in an action to foreclose a mortgage, instead of the traditional administrative tax
sale procedures embodied in article 10 of the RPTL. Id. § 1104(3). In addition, the Uniform
Act allows tax districts to adopt procedures to foreclose tax liens owned by the tax district
itself by an action in rem, displacing the procedures of article 10 of the RPTL for tax liens
which are not less than four years old. Id. The major advantage of the in rem proceedings
over the administrative tax sale procedures is that a tax district which does not wish to sell
tax liens to private speculators does not have to go through the formality of a tax sale to
itself. Compare N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 1120(1) (McKinney Supp. 1987) ("Whenever it
appears that a tax district owns a tax lien which has been due and unpaid for a period of at
least four years... such tax lien... shall be summarily foreclosed... notwithstanding any
omission to hold a tax sale prior to such foreclosure") with N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW §
1008(3) (McKinney Supp. 1987) ("the board of supervisors of any county may by resolution
authorize and direct the county treasurer to purchase lands at the tax sale, without competi-
tive bidding, for the gross amount due thereon.")
9 See N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW §§ 1000-1030 (McKinney 1972 & Supp. 1987); infra
notes 19-26 and accompanying text.
o See Elinor Homes Co. v. St. Lawrence, 113 App. Div. 2d 25, 32-33, 494 N.Y.S.2d 889,
894-95 (2d Dep't 1985); see also Note, Tax Sale Law in New Jersey: A Re-Examination, 26
RUTGERS L. REv. 266, 276, 288-89 (1973) (suggesting less burdensome procedures on individ-
ual tax sale purchasers as essential to effective tax collection). But see Godfrey, supra note
1, at 277-79 (suggesting that administrative tax sale is ineffective when delinquent realty
becomes unmarketable); HILLHOUSE & CHATTERS, TAX REVERTED PROPERTIES IN URBAN AR-
EAS 9 (1942) (people less willing to buy delinquent properties).
", See Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791, 806-07 (1983) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting); Note, The Constitutionality of Notice by Publication in Tax Sale Proceedings,
84 YALE L.J. 1505, 1511-15 (1975). The fourteenth amendment provides in part: "nor shall
any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law ......
U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
12 See, e.g., Cooper v. Makela, 629 F. Supp. 658, 660-62 (W.D.N.Y. 1986) (holding
RPTL sections 1002 and 1014 unconstitutional as applied to mortgagees); Sheehan v.
County of Suffolk, 67 N.Y.2d 52, 56-59, 490 N.E.2d 523, 524-25, 499 N.Y.S.2d 656, 657-58,
(tax sale procedures in Suffolk, Orange, and Sullivan counties provide constitutional notice)
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sponded to criticism by enacting sweeping procedural changes to
avoid constitutional challenges.13
Challenges to administrative tax sales have focused on the ad-
equacy of the notice informing property owners that they might
lose their properties. 14 Although in rem proceedings, including tax
sales, were historically thought to require only minimal notice,' 5
the United States Supreme Court long ago rejected that theory in
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co."6 More recently, in
Mennonite Board of Missions v. Adams,'7 the Court held the gen-
eral standards of due process applicable in the context of an ad-
ministrative tax sale. 18
cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 3299 (1986); McCann v. Scaduto, 123 App. Div. 2d 111, 116, 510
N.Y.S.2d 149, 153 (2d Dep't 1986) (per curiam) (provisions of Nassau County, N.Y., Admin-
strative Code ("NCAC") in effect before November, 1986 held constitutional).
is See NASSAU COUNTY, N.Y. LocAL LAW No. 13 (Nov. 17, 1986); see also Nassau County
Ends Home Tax-Lien System, N.Y. Times, Nov. 24, 1986, at D14, col. 1. (discussing amend-
ments to NCAC tax sale procedures).
14 See Cooper, 629 F. Supp. at 659; Sheehan, 67 N.Y.2d at 56, 490 N.E.2d at 524, 499
N.Y.S.2d at 657; McCann, 123 App. Div. 2d at 112, 510 N.Y.S.2d at 150.
" See Longyear v. Toolan, 209 U.S. 414, 417-18 (1908); see also Ballard v. Hunter, 204
U.S. 241, 262 (1907) (notice by publication did not deprive owner of due process); Leigh v.
Green, 193 U.S. 79, 90-93 (1904) (publication of notice which merely described land
adequate).
The rationale for requiring less notice in proceedings against property stemmed from
the territorial theory of jurisdiction, under which a state could adjudicate matters relating
only to persons and property within its borders. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 720
(1878). Thus, states developed in rem proceedings to gain jurisdiction over the property of
nonresident owners against whom notice by publication was deemed sufficient. Id. at 727.
This minimal notice rule was then invoked in in rem proceedings against resident property
owners despite the availability of personal service. See Leigh, 193 U.S. at 92. Notice by
publication in tax sales was justified by: the fiction that the proceeding was against the land
only and that the owner was deemed to have a duty to keep informed of actions affecting his
property-the "caretaker theory," see, e.g., Huling v. Kaw Valley Ry. & Improvement Corp.,
130 U.S. 559, 563-64 (1889); the argument that when one does not pay the property taxes
due on his land, he knows that his property will be sold, see Botens v. Aronauer, 32 N.Y.2d
243, 248-49, 298 N.E.2d 73, 74-75, 344 N.Y.S.2d 892, 895, appeal dismissed, 414 U.S. 1059
(1973); and the government's strong interest in collecting taxes. See supra notes 4-5 and
accompanying text; Note, supra note 11, at 1511-14.
16 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
' 462 U.S. 791 (1983).
Id. at 798. Articulating the standard for notice that satisfies due process, the Mul-
lane Court stated that notice should be "reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances,
to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity
to present their objections." 339 U.S. at 314. Mullane expressly rejected the contention that
the notice required should hinge on the classification of an action as in personam, in rem, or
qausi in rem. Id. at 312. Nonetheless, before Mennonite, several state courts, including the
New York Court of Appeals, held that publication was adequate notice of a pending tax
sale. See, e.g., Botens, 32 N.Y.2d at 249, 298 N.E.2d at 75, 344 N.Y.S.2d at 896 (distinguish-
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This Note will analyze existing law regarding administrative
tax sales in New York and will discuss procedures which may lack
the degree of notice required by the due process clause. The Note
will outline the RPTL enforcement procedures with respect to de-
linquent tax and compare them with the procedures used by Nas-
sau County. These procedures will be evaluated in light of recent
case law, and it will be suggested that several major municipalities
in New York must amend their administrative tax sale procedures
to provide to property owners actual notice prior to any tax sale.
Furthermore, it will be suggested that the RPTL, as well as several
local laws, must be changed to afford mortgagees, and others with
an interest in the property, notice prior to a tax sale.
CURRENT PROCEDURE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE TAx SALE IN
NEW YORK
The RPTL requires administrative tax sale proceedings to be
initiated whenever unpaid taxes are returned to the county trea-
surer.1" If those taxes remain unpaid for a locally specified period,
the county treasurer commences a tax sale proceeding by sending
notice of the sale by first class mail to the name and address of the
owner or occupant listed on the assessment roll, and publishing a
notice describing the properties to be sold." When the statutory
ing Mullane because a delinquent taxpayer should know his property will be sold); see also
Comment, supra note 5, at 395 n.33 (collecting cases).
In Mennonite, the Court attempted to end this controversy by applying the Mullane
standards to tax sales. See Mennonite, 462 U.S. at 798. Plaintiff, the Mennonite Board of
Missions, was the mortgagee of certain property which, pursuant to Indiana law, was sold at
a tax sale when the mortgagor failed to pay the property tax. Id. at 792-94. The Mennonite
Board did not receive actual notice either prior to the tax sale or before expiration of the
period during which the property could be redeemed. See id. at 794. Thus the only notice
informing the Mennonite Board of the threat to its valuable interest in the property was the
notice posted in the county courthouse and published three times in a newspaper. See id. at
793. The Court, citing Mullane, held that the notice provisions of the Indiana code violated
the mortagee's right to due process. See id. at 798; see also Mullane, 339 U.S. at 315 ("It
would be idle to pretend that publication alone as prescribed here, is a reliable means of
acquainting interested parties of the fact that their rights are before the courts.").
19 See N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW §§ 936, 1000 (McKinney 1972 & Supp. 1987). Upon
the return of the unpaid delinquent taxes, five percent of the tax is added to the total
amount due. See id. § 936(2) (McKinney 1972). This Note will be limited primarily to
county procedures since counties are generally responsible for the enforcement of real prop-
erty taxes; special rules are applicable to other governmental units. See id. §§ 1300-1342
(school districts); §§ 1400-1412 (villages) (McKinney 1972 & Supp. 1987).
20 See N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAw §§ 1000, 1002 (McKinney 1972 & Supp. 1987);
see, e.g., 17 Op. State Compt. 58 (1961) (treasurer must hold tax sale of properties on which
taxes are delinquent). In most counties following the RPTL, tax sale proceedings commence
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notice requirements are satisfied, the county treasurer must "sell
the property" for the amount of tax owing on it.21 Following the
sale, the owner, occupant, mortgagee, or other interested party
may, within a one-year period, redeem the property.22 Moreover, at
least three months prior to the expiration of the one year redemp-
tion period, the county treasurer must publish a notice of unre-
deemed property and must, prior to publication, send notice by
first class mail to the name and address of the owner or occupant. 3
on August 1, if the tax is still unpaid as of that date. See N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 1000
(McKinney 1972 & Supp. 1987). The mailed notice must "contain a brief description of such
parcel, the aggregate amount due on such parcel at the time of sale, and a statement that
unless such amount is paid prior to the commencement of tax sale proceedings the parcel
will be sold." Id. § 1002(4) (McKinney 1972 & Supp. 1987) The published notice should
include a brief description of the parcel, the name of the owner or occupant appearing on
the tax rolls, and the aggregate amount of taxes due at the time of the sale. Id. § 1002(1).
The published notice must appear in two newspapers designated by the county board of
supervisors, and must be published once every other week for a six week period prior to the
day of the tax sale. See id. § 1002(2).
21 N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 1006 (McKinney 1972). The sale price includes the
amount of the original tax plus: five percent of the original tax, added pursuant to section
936; ten percent per annum interest from the day of February following the levy of the tax;
and expenses chargeable against the parcel, including the expense of mailing the notice of
the tax sale. Id. § 1002 (McKinney 1972 & Supp. 1987).
At the tax sale the purchaser does not actually obtain the property, rather he receives a
tax sale certificate; this certificate represents an inchoate right to a conveyance of the realty
that will mature only in the event that a redemption payment is not made. See United
States v. General Douglas MacArthur Senior Village, Inc., 366 F. Supp. 302, 304 (E.D.N.Y.
1973), aft'd, 508 F.2d 377 (2d Cir. 1974).
22 See N.Y. REAL PROP. TAx LAW § 1010 (McKinney Supp. 1987). Payment is made to
the county treasurer for the benefit of the tax sale purchaser. See id. The redemption price
includes the amount paid at the tax sale plus interest and other amounts assessed on the
property. See id. "The right to redeem land sold to enforce the collection of taxes assessed
against it exists only as permitted by [the RPTL] and under such conditions as are ex-
pressed therein." See Elinor Homes Co. v. St. Lawrence, 113 App. Div. 2d 25, 29, 494
N.Y.S.2d 889, 892 (2d Dep't 1985). A one year redemption period is extended to three years
in the case of occupied or mortgaged property. N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW §§ 1022, 1024
(McKinney 1972 & Supp. 1987); see infra note 24 and accompanying text.
2 See N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 1014 (McKinney 1972 & Supp. 1987). The notice
must contain, inter alia, "the amount necessary to redeem the parcel computed to the last
day on which such redemption can be made and. . . [must state] that unless such parcel is
redeemed on or before such day it will be conveyed to the purchaser." Id. § 1014(3) (McKin-
ney Supp. 1987). The mailed notice must be given at least fourteen days prior to the com-
mencement of the published notice, and the expense of such notice is deemed part of the
tax due on the property so that either the redeeming owner or the tax sale purchaser who
eventually takes title to the property must pay said tax. See id. The mailed notice required
by section 1014 should be addressed to the owner of record at the time of the mailing. See
Op. Couns. St. Bd. Equalization & Assessment No. 68. Section 1022 requires that notice to
redeem be given to the occupant, but failure to do so merely extends the redemption period.
See N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 1022 (McKinney 1972 & Supp. 1987); see, e.g., Congrega-
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If the property is not redeemed, the county treasurer will execute a
recordable conveyance of the property, which vests absolute title in
fee in the tax sale purchaser.24
Local laws also govern administrative tax sales and where the
RPTL differs, local law controls.25 The Nassau County Administra-
tive Code ("NCAC"), unlike the RPTL, provides advance notice of
the tax sale solely by publication. 26 In addition, the RPTL and sev-
eral local laws do not provide notice to mortgagees and others with
similar interests in real property.2 7 The NCAC had been severely
tion Yetev Lev D'Satmar, Inc. v. County of Sullivan, 59 N.Y.2d 418, 452 N.E.2d 1207, 465
N.Y.S.2d 879 (1983) (mailed notice to record owner, though different from occupant, is
sufficient).
21 N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW §§ 1018(1), 1020(1) (McKinney 1972 & Supp. 1987). The
tax sale purchaser must, within five years, apply to the county treasurer for a conveyance of
the property otherwise his certificate becomes void. Id. § 1018(2), (3) (McKinney 1972). In
tax districts that have adopted Title Two of the Uniform Act (RPTL sections 1110-1116),
tax purchasers may, in the alternative, foreclose their tax lien as in an action to foreclose a
mortgage pursuant to the real property actions and proceedings law. Id. §§ 1114, 1116 (Mc-
Kinney 1972 & Supp. 1987). It would, however, be highly unusual for a tax lien speculator to
elect to go through the expensive foreclosure proceeding merely to recoup his investment
plus interest; he could more easily take a conveyance of the property in fee and dispose of it,
possibly receiving windfall profits. See McCann v. Scaduto, 123 App. Div. 2d 111, 120, 510
N.Y.S.2d 149, 155 (2d Dep't 1986) (Lazer, J., dissenting) ("Not suprisingly, nearly all
lienholders opted for the much simpler procedure 'to elect to accept a deed of conveyance of
such property'" under similar provisions of NCAC).
The redemption period for occupied or mortgaged parcels, or both, is extended to three
years. N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW §§ 1022, 1024 (McKinney 1972 & Supp. 1987). The pur-
chaser, after receiving a conveyance upon the expiration of section 1018's one year redemp-
tion period, may limit the three year period to six months (effectively making the minimum
redemption period one year and six months) by personally serving the occupant or a mature
member of his family, or, when the occupant resides outside the city or town where the
property is located, by mailing a duly prescribed notice of redemption and filing within one
month an affidavit stating that the notice was duly served. See id. (McKinney 1972 & Supp.
1987). If notice is duly served and recorded, and the property has not been redeemed, the
purchaser acquires indefeasible title to the property and all others shall be forever barred
from redeeming such real property. See id. §§ 1022(1)(c), 1024(1) (McKinney 1972 & Supp.
1987). Thereafter, the conveyance may be cancelled only upon a finding, within five years of
the expiration of the redemption period, that the tax sale, or the underlying tax, was uncon-
stitutional or otherwise illegal. Id. § 1020(3) (McKinney 1972); see, e.g., Union & New Ha-
ven Trust Co. v. People, 26 Misc. 2d 831, 215 N.Y.S.2d 88 (1960) (when assessment of land
invalid, tax deed to land void), afl'd, 15 App. Div. 2d 1, 221 N.Y.S.2d 320 (3d Dep't 1961).
22 See 1 N.Y. St. & Loc. Tax Serv. (P-H) (P 33,)650-34,097 (1986); see also Godfrey,
supra note 1, at 281-85 (discussing local tax procedure).
26 See NAsSAU COUNTY, N.Y., An, N. CODE §§ 5-37.0, 5-39.0 (1982). The NCAC provides
for publication in a designated newspaper once in each of three successive calendar weeks
and provides for sale of the tax liens "without further notice." See id.
217 See N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 1002 (McKinney 1972 & Supp. 1987); NASsAu
COUNTY, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 5-37.0 (1982); Suffolk County Tax Act, ch. 311, §§ 43, 45,
[1920] N.Y. Laws 867, as amended by Ch. 650, § 1, [1964] N.Y. Laws 1735, reprinted in 1
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criticized because of its notice by publication provisions, 2' and the
intricate legal jargon contained in mailed notices.29
Nassau, in November 1986, amended the NCAC.30 Residential
"class one" property owned by county residents now requires that
notice to redeem must be personally served on the owner.3 1 With
regard to all property, the notice must "be printed in a clear and
coherent manner using words with common and everyday mean-
ings. ' 32 Moreover, those holding liens on residential property may
no longer "elect to accept a conveyance to the property." Instead,
their remedy "shall be limited to an action to foreclose the tax
lien."'3 3 Although these amendments to the NCAC are a welcome
N.Y. St. & Loc. Tax Serv. (P-H) 11 34,018-34,019 (1986).
28 NASSAU COUNTY, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 5-37.0 (1982); see McCann v. Scaduto, 123 App.
Div. 2d 111, 119, 510 N.Y.S.2d 149, 155 (2d Dep't 1986) (Lazer, J., dissenting) (amendments
to NCAC "prompted in part... by the extreme results" it allowed). The NCAC has been
criticized for permitting private individuals, hoping to get title to properties for much less
than market value, to speculate in tax liens. See Newsday, Nov. 16, 1986, at 22.
29 See Newsday, Nov. 16, 1986, at 5; N.Y. Times, Nov. 24, 1986, at D14, col. 1 ("people
who lost their homes [thought] ... the letter [informing them that they had three months to
redeem their property] was unclear and did not spell out the consequences of the action").
When notice is mailed to the owner, its only reference to the consequences of nonredemp-
tion is an indication of the "day upon which the holder of the tax lien may elect to accept a
deed of conveyance of such property or to call his money and foreclose his tax lien." NASSAU
COUNTY, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 5-51.0 (as amended Nov. 17, 1986). A conveyance under the
NCAC entails consequences radically different from those of a conveyance under the RPTL:
the conveyance in Nassau entitles the holder, upon recordation, to obtain actual possession
of the property; whereas even after a conveyance pursuant to RPTL section 1018, in the
case of occupied or mortgaged property, or both, there is an additional redemption period of
up to two years. Compare NASSAU COUNTY, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE §§ 5-52.0, 5-56.0 (1981) with
N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 1020(2) (McKinney 1972 & Supp. 1987). See also N.Y. REAL
PROP. TAx LAW §§ 1022, 1024 (McKinney 1972 & Supp. 1987) (sections extending redemp-
tion period even after conveyance).
20 See NASSAU COUNTY, N.Y., LocAL LAW No. 13 (as amended Nov. 17, 1986).
21 See NASSAU COUNTY, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE 5-51.0(c) (as amended Nov. 17, 1986). Notice
to nonresident owners is by certified mail. See id. Personal service to a natural person is
delivery to the person to be notified or delivery to a qualified other person at the home or
business, provided that in the latter case notice must also be mailed to the person's last
known residence. See N.Y. CIv. PRAC. L. & R. 308(1), (2) (McKinney Supp. 1987). If neither
of these methods is possible, personal service may be accomplished by affixing a notice to
the door of the person's business or home and mailing notice to the last known address. N.Y.
CIVIL PRAC. L. & R. 308(4) (McKinney 1987); see also N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. 309, 310, 311
(McKinney 1972 & Supp. 1987) (personal service upon infants and incompetents; partner-
ships; and corporations, respectively).
"Class one" property is defined in the RPTL to include all one, two and three family
residential property. See N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 1802(1) (McKinney Supp. 1987).
22 NASSAU COUNTY, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 5-51.0(b) (as amended Nov. 17, 1986).
' See NASSAU COUNTY, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 5-75.0 (added Nov. 17, 1986) (only applica-
ble to residential "class one" property). The clear benefit of limiting the remedy to foreclo-
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step towards more equitable administration of the real property
tax, it is submitted that the changes made in Nassau and other
counties, particularly with respect to notice procedures, still do not
satisfy the due process clause of either the federal or New York
constitution.3
4
CONSTITUTIONAL NOTICE DUE PERSONS SUBJECT TO A TAX SALE
A. Notice to Owners and Occupants
Notice by personal service, though certainly more reliable than
other methods, 35 has never been held to be constitutionally re-
quired in tax sales." The requirement that tax lienors of residen-
sure of the lien is the avoidance of a complete forfeiture of the owner's interest in cases in
which the amount of the lien is far less than the value of the property. This is true because,
in a foreclosure proceeding, after all liens on the property and expenses of the mortgage
prodeeding have been paid, the prior owner of the property, as owner of the equity of re-
demption, is entitled to any surplus. See N.Y. REAL PROP. AcTs. LAW §§ 1311, 1361 (McKin-
ney 1979). Thus, the tax sale purchaser's recovery would be limited to the amount he paid
at the sale plus interest and costs. See id. § 1354 (McKinney 1979 & Supp. 1987).
The only other significant amendment to the NCAC is the establishment of a "Hard-
ship Review Board" which has the power, in cases of hardship applicable only to "class one"
residential property that the owner uses as his principal dwelling place, and upon applica-
tion within two years of the tax sale, to grant a one year extension to pay back taxes, inter-
est, and other charges. NAssAu CouNTY. N.Y., ADMIN. CODE §§ 5-76.0(c), 5-24.0(8) (as
amended Nov. 17, 1986).
" See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; N.Y. CONST. art. 1, § 6. In the administration of
property taxes, the state constitution has no greater notice requirements than those of the
federal Constitution. See Botens v. Aronauer, 32 N.Y.2d 243, 248-49, 298 N.E.2d 73, 74-75,
344 N.Y.S.2d 892, 894-96, appeal dismissed, 414 U.S. 1059 (1973); In re 801-15 East New
York Ave., 290 N.Y. 236, 240-41, 48 N.E.2d 502, 504 (1943). See also Godfrey, Enforcement
of Delinquent Property Taxes in New York (Part III), 25 ALB. L. REV. 212, 225 n.72 (1961)
(citing New York Court of Appeals cases).
"I See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950) ("Per-
sonal service of written notice within the jurisdiction is the classic form of notice always
adequate in any type of proceeding").
11 See Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791, 800 (1983); see also Mullane,
339 U.S. at 314 ("Personal service has not in all circumstances been regarded as indispensa-
ble to the process due to residents.... We disturb none of the established rules on these
subjects."). The factors that weigh against providing personal notice are: the sheer expense
of providing such service to delinquent taxpayers, see Harris v. Gaul, 572 F. Supp. 1554,
1556-57 (N.D. Ohio 1983); Comment, supra note 5, at 403-04 n.81; the fact that taxpayers
are charged with the knowledge that taxes must be paid regularly, see Congregation Yetev
Lev D'Satmar, Inc. v. County of Sullivan, 59 N.Y.2d 418, 427, 452 N.E.2d 1207, 1212, 465
N.Y.S.2d 879, 884 (1983); cf. Mennonite, 462 U.S. at 807-08 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (state
tax assessment occurs with regularity and predictability); Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S.
516, 532 (1982) (that persons owning property within State charged with knowledge of rele-
vant statutory provisions affecting control or disposition of such property); and the need of
local government to collect the tax expeditiously, see Mennonite, 462 U.S. at 805-06
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61:113
tial property foreclose the lien instead of simply accepting a con-
veyance, as they had formerly done, is likewise not constitutionally
required, because the forfeiture involved in the automatic convey-
ance occurs only after a lengthy redemption period.3 7 Similarly, the
requirement that notice be in comprehensible language is a reform
that enhances the likelihood that the tax will be paid and protects
property owners by informing them clearly of the consequences of
inaction. Therefore, while the amendments to the NCAC give
greater protection to property owners, they are not constitutionally
required. Nassau County and several other counties in New York,
however, still give notice prior to the tax sale only by publica-
tion. 9 In light of the holding in Mennonite that "[t]he tax sale
immediately and drastically diminishes the value" of the prop-
erty,40 it is argued that, at minimum, mailed notice must be given
to the owner in fee prior to the tax sale.41
The Court in Mennonite stated that, before conducting a tax
sale at which a lien diminishing a person's property interest will be
granted, and which "may result in the complete nullification" of
(O'Connor, J., dissenting).
37 See, e.g., Chapman v. Zobelein, 237 U.S. 135, 138 (1915); Sheehan v. County of Suf-
folk, 67 N.Y.2d 52, 59-60, 490 N.E.2d 523, 525-26, 499 N.Y.S.2d 656, 658-59, cert. denied,
106 S. Ct. 3299 (1986); McCann v. Scaduto, 123 App. Div. 2d 111, 127-28, 510 N.Y.S.2d 149,
160-61 (2d Dep't 1986) (Lazer, J., dissenting).
See supra note 29 (problems with unclear notice); cf. N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-702
(McKinney Supp. 1987) ("plain English" statute for certain consumer contracts).
3' See, e.g., NASSAU COUNTY, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE §§ 5-37.0, 5-39.0 (1981) (unchanged by
NASSAU COUNTY, N.Y., LOCAL LAW Nov. 13, 1986); WESTCHESTER COUNTY, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE
§ 283.391 (1987), reprinted in 1 N.Y. St. & Loc. Tax Serv. (P-H) 1 34,071.15 (June 11, 1962)
(providing for only constructive notice, published and posted); Niagara County Tax Act, ch.
160, § 7, [1937] N.Y. Laws 611, reprinted in 1 N.Y. St. & Loc. Tax Serv. (P-H) % 33,894
(Apr. 19, 1937) (published notice). But see N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 1002(4) (McKinney
Supp. 1987) (requiring first class mail notice sent to owner or occupant).
'0 Mennonite, 462 U.S. at 798. Justice O'Connor's vigorous dissent in Mennonite did
not question the majority's assertion that the tax sale diminished the value of the mortga-
gee's interest. See id. at 806-09 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
See McCann, 123 App. Div. 2d at 124, 510 N.Y.S.2d at 158 (Lazer, J., dissenting)
(attributing failure to comply with Mullane in tax sales to "apparent reluctance to upset
widespread traditional practices"). Justice Lazer recognized that notice of the tax sale
mailed to the owner is a fundamental due process requirement. See id. at 123, 510 N.Y.S.2d
at 157 (Lazer, J., dissenting). It was erroneously assumed that Nassau County's amend-
ments to the NCAC provided for such notice. Id. at 125, 510 N.Y.S.2d at 159 (Lazer, J.,
dissenting). Justice Lazer also mistakenly asserted that "until [Nassau County's] recent re-
pair of relevant portions of the code, it remained alone among the counties in the State to
retain publication as the only method of giving notice of tax lien sales." Id. In fact, other
counties in the state use publication as the sole method of notice of impending tax sale. See
supra note 39 and accompanying text.
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his property interest, the municipality must give due process no-
tice to those affected.42 Both the granting of a lien and the ulti-
mate divestment of the property are basic to tax lien sales, as are
the NCAC procedures.43 When the interested party is "reasonably
identifiable" this requirement is not met solely by constructive no-
tice.44 The Court found that mortgagees who have recorded their
mortgages in the public land records are "reasonably ascertaina-
ble." 4 5 Furthermore, owners have a greater property interest than
mortgagees, ' and are easier to identify and locate.47 Therefore,
mandatory mailed notice to owners and occupants, before the
42 Mennonite, 462 U.S. at 798.
':1 See NASSAU CouNwr, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE §§ 5-39.0, 5-58.0 (1981); Godfrey, supra note
1, at 282-85. The McCann court justified Nassau County's notice by publication by distin-
guishing the NCAC tax sale provisions from the Indiana statute at issue in Mennonite. See
McCann, 123 App. Div. 2d at 116-17, 510 N.Y.S.2d at 153. The majority stated the disposi-
tive factor in Mennonite was that "title to the mortgaged premises passed to the purchaser
at the sale, subject to defeasement only if the former owner redeemed the property by pay-
ing his taxes." Id. at 116, 510 N.Y.S.2d at 153. The court used the word "title" because the
Indiana statute employed the following language: "The county treasurer shall sell the real
property. . . ." IND. CODE ANN. § 6-1.1-24-5(e) (West Supp. 1986). But, just as under New
York's RPTL and Nassau's Administrative Code, the purchaser in Indiana does not actually
become the owner in fee simple until a lengthy redemption period has expired. See IND.
CODE ANN. § 6-1.1-25-4 (West 1982); N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW §§ 1018, 1020, 1022, 1024
(McKinney 1972 & Supp. 1987). The McCann majority "distinguished" the NCAC, noting
that "[tihe tax lien purchaser [in Nassau County] does not obtain title to the premises on
the date of the sale but merely acquires a tax lien and does not become entitled to exercise
any possessory interest in the premises until the end of the statutory two year redemption
period." McCann, 123 App. Div. 2d at 117, 510 N.Y.S.2d at 153; NASSAU CouNTY, N.Y., AD-
rAIN. CODE § 5-52.0 (1981). The same statement, however, describes the precise rights of the
tax sale purchaser under the statutes addressed in Mennonite. See IND. CODE ANN. § 6-1.1-
24-9(b) (West 1982).
A tax sale under the NCAC or the RPTL is a condition precedent to the owner losing
his property and gives the purchaser "a lien which ha[s] priority over other liens and over
the owner's fee title as well," see McCann, 123 App. Div. 2d at 127, 510 N.Y.S.2d at 160
(Lazer, J., dissenting), which is precisely the way the Supreme Court analyzed the Indiana
statute. See Mennonite, 462 U.S. at 793 (purchaser acquires certificate of sale which consti-
tutes lien against real property for amount paid). The liens acquired by tax sale purchasers
in New York "immediately and drastically diminishes the value" of any other interest in the
property, as do the liens under Indiana law, and Mennonite demands that those with such
an interest be given notice prior to the tax sale. See McCann, 123 App. Div. 2d at 130, 510
N.Y.S.2d at 162 (Lazer, J., dissenting).
" See Mennonite, 462 U.S. at 798.
" See id.
4" See Comment, Mennonite Board of Missions v. Adams: Expansion of the Due Pro-
cess Requirement, 46 LA. L. REv. 311, 319 (1985).
'7 See N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 502 (McKinney 1984). The name of the property
owner is recorded on the tax rolls at the county treasurer's office, so there is no need to
search land records to give owners notice. See id.
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value of their interests is lessened by the tax sale, is necessary to
satisfy due process and should be required in all municipalities
that do not already do so.
B. Notice to Mortgagees and Those With Similar Interests
New York's RPTL provides for conditional notice to mortga-
gees under article 11 in rem foreclosures, 4 but mortgagees do not
receive such notice under the administrative tax sale of article 1049
nor the various local laws.50 The Supreme Court refined the Mul-
lane standard in Mennonite, extending the due process notice re-
quirement to administrative tax sales.5 1 In Mennonite, the Court
held that a mortgagee, as a party with a substantial property inter-
est, was entitled, when his identity was reasonably ascertainable,
to actual notice prior to the tax sale,52 but it declined to decide
whether notice could be conditioned upon such persons filing with
the taxing authority.53 Thus, the Court shifted its focus from
whether, under all the circumstances, the notice was reasonably
calculated to inform, to whether the names of such persons are rea-
sonably ascertainable. 54
8 See N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 1126 (McKinney 1972). Such notice is given without
charge and the filing is valid for five years. Id.
9 See N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 1002 (McKinney 1972 & Supp. 1987). When the
mortgagee is not given mailed notice before the tax sale, conditional or otherwise, Mennon-
ite is applicable, see supra notes 42-45 and accompanying text, therefore, this provision was
held unconstitutional as applied to mortgagees. See Cooper v. Makela, 629 F. Supp. 658, 662
(W.D.N.Y. 1986).
80 See supra note 39. One New York appellate court divided on the issue of conditional
notice. See In re Foreclosure of Tax Liens by County of Erie, 103 App. Div. 2d 636, 639-40,
481 N.Y.S.2d 547, 550 (4th Dep't 1984) (applying Mennonite in holding unconstitutional in
rem tax foreclosure giving mortgagee only conditional notice); but see id. at 640-41, 481
N.Y.S.2d at 551 (Boomer, J., concurring) (due process satisfied if conditional notice statute
was properly drafted, so that once mortgagee files, the sending of notice mandatory, not
discretionary).
51 Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791, 795-800 (1983).
52 Id. at 798.
11 See id. at 793 n.2. In 1980, after the tax sale at issue had already occurred, Indiana
provided for mailed notice to mortgagees if the mortgagee requested such notice each year
and paid a fee to cover the cost of mailing notice. See IND. CODE ANN. § 6-1.1-24-4.2 (West
1982). The statute was amended in 1986 and now provides for mandatory, unconditional
notice to mortgagees, and others with a substantial interest in the realty. See IND. CODE
ANN. § 6-1.1-24-4.2 (West Supp. 1986).
See Mennonite, 462 U.S. at 800. "Notice by mail or other means as certain to ensure
actual notice is a minimum constitutional precondition to a proceeding which will adversely
affect the liberty or property interest of any party .... if its name and address are reasona-
bly ascertainable." Id. This shift was criticized by the dissent as an unwarranted departure
from the Mullane standards. See id. at 800-01 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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The relative difficulty or ease of determining affected* persons'
names and addresses should be only one factor which must be
weighed against the government's strong interest in collecting
taxes and the burden involved in giving notice.5 The Mennonite
decision was criticized as increasing the burden on the notifier be-
yond that intended by Mullane,6 yet the Court explicitly found
Mullane to be controlling.57 Because the Mullane balancing stan-
dards have been universally followed,58 issues such as conditional
notice of tax sales to mortgagees, should be decided based upon
application of these standards rather than seeking rigid rules as to
whom receives a particular form of notice. 9
While Mennonite left many questions unanswered, it is sub-
mitted that a careful application of the Mullane balancing ap-
proach " reveals that conditional notice to mortgagees is "reasona-
bly calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested
parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportu-
nity to present their objections."61 The names and addresses of
mortgagees may be difficult and expensive to ascertain, thereby in-
fringing on the state's interest in efficient collection of taxes, 2
5 See Mennonite, 462 U.S. at 806-07 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); Mullane v. Central
Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313-14 (1950).
11 See supra note 54.
' Mennonite, 462 U.S. at 798.
' See id. at 797 ("this Court has adhered unwaveringly to the principle announced in
Mullane.")
59 See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976); Cafeteria & Restaurant
Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961); Walker v. City of Hutchinson, 352 U.S. 112,
115 (1956).
11 See Mullane, 339 U.S. at 313-16 (against state interest, balance individual interest
protected by fourteenth amendment). The dissent in Mennonite was critical of the majority
for its cursory application of the Mullane balancing test, believing too little weight was
given to the state's interest in collecting taxes. See Mennonite, 462 U.S. at 800-09
(O'Connor, J., dissenting); see also Comment, supra note 46, at 315.
" See Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314 (emphasis added).
02 See Mennonite, 462 U.S. at 806 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). "[That burden is not
limited to mailing notice. Rather, the State must have someone check the records and ascer-
tain with respect to each delinquent taxpayer whether there is a mortgagee, perhaps
whether the mortgage has been paid off, and whether there is a dependable address." Id.
(O'Connor, J., dissenting); see also In re Foreclosure of Tax Liens by the County of Erie,
103 App. Div. 2d 636, 641, 481 N.Y.S.2d 547, 551 (4th Dep't 1984) (Boomer, J., concurring)
(heavy burden will be placed upon Erie County if required to make title search of each of
thousands of properties in tax foreclosure proceedings); Comment, supra note 5, at 403 n.81
(expense of title search in Buffalo, New York: $75-100). The interest of the taxing munici-
pality, which represents all of its residents, is analogous to the trust plan in Mullane, where
beneficiaries not "on the books" did not have to be given actual notice. See Mullane, 339
U.S. at 317-18. "Nor do we consider it unreasonable for the State to dispense with more
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whereas the mortgagees' interest, though substantial, is not as im-
portant as that of the property owner."3 Since it is the common
business practice of mortgagees to keep themselves informed of ac-
tions affecting their interest, conditional notice is a reasonable
mechanism for providing due process in light of the comparatively
greater burden of requiring actual notice. 4 Thus, it is suggested
that the due process clause of the Constitution demands notice be
given to mortgagees, and those with similar interests; but this no-
tice may be conditioned on their filing with the taxing authority.
CONCLUSION
New York's law governing delinquent property taxes divides
responsibility among too many governing bodies and is based upon
antiquated procedures. 5 This may help explain why, thirty-seven
years after the Supreme Court specified requisite notice proce-
dures in Mullane, some New York municipalities still hold admin-
istrative tax sales without adequate notice. Recent reforms in Nas-
sau County are an encouraging sign, but Nassau and other counties
still give only published notice prior to tax sales. It is submitted
that these counties must minimally provide to delinquent property
owners mailed notice of the impending tax sale to comply with
constitutional requirements. Further, it is submitted that tax sale
laws such as RPTL article 10, which do not provide actual notice
to mortgagees, are likewise unconstitutional. Due, however, to the
practical difficulties of ascertaining the identity and location of
mortgagees and others with a substantial interest in the delinquent
property, notice may be conditioned upon such persons filing with
the taxing authority.
Paul G. Mackey
certain notice to those . . .whose interests . . .although they could be discovered upon
investigation, do not in due course of business come to [the] knowledge [of the person giving
notice]." Id. As only the owner in fee is personally liable for property taxes, mortgagees do
not appear on the tax rolls and thus "do not in due course of business come to [the] knowl-
edge" of the taxing authority. See N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 502 (McKinney 1984 & Supp.
1987).
" See Comment, supra note 46, at 321.
64 See Mennonite, 462 U.S. at 806-09 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); In re Foreclosure of
Tax Liens by County of Erie, 103 App. Div. 2d 636, 641, 481 N.Y.S.2d 547, 551 (4th Dep't
1984) (Boomer, J., concurring).
6 Godfrey, supra note 1, at 285-86.
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